Transcribed from several documents received from Roger Griffiths (Advance Sailing Telegrams and A1 forms) - His source: Public Records Office, Kew.

Further details have been added with the help of:
"Axis Submarine Successes of WW II", Jürgen Rohwer
"The Allied Convoy System", Arnold Hague
and "The World's Merchant Fleets 1939", R. W. Jordan.

† = dead, s=survived

Notes:
Commodore (name illegible) was in Bassa, Vice Commodore Rear Admiral H. C. Allen in Cairnesk. The Commodore says the convoy had 51 ships.

* Empire Scout fell out of the convoy during the night of Aug. 20/21 due to engine trouble, rejoined on the 29th.
Helgøy fell out during the night of Aug. 24/25.
Merchant Royal was missing when the Bermuda section (BHX) joined Halifax portion on Aug. 20.
Yorkmoor was sent back to Sydney Aug. 18 - unable to keep up with convoy speed

Escorts: HMS Ausonia, until 14:00 on Aug. 27, 55 45N 23W, HMCS Assiniboine, HMCS Ottawa (? hard to desipher hand writing), HMS Mackay (destroyer), HMS Jason, HMS Hibiscus and HMS Heartsease (both corvettes).

The Commodore seems happy with the ships' ability to keep their stations, in particular Gregalia, Empire Tiger and Vaalaren. Similarly, he brags about Gregalia, Esmond, Karamea, Empire Penguin and Coultarn for their visual and W/T signalling.

Commodore of HX 66A (after HX 66 had split at rendezvous point on Aug. 28) was H. C. Allen in Cairnesk, and Vice Commodore was Captain J. Davitt in Esmond. Escorts were HMS Jason and HMS Hibiscus, from "split position to arrival Firth of Forth (Methil)". Air escort was present during "daylight hours Thursday 29th August and periodically during 30th and 31st August 1940." This part of the convoy consisted of 19 ships, 16 were still present upon arrival, 3 ships having been sunk as follows:

Commodore Allen's notes for HX 66A - dated Aug. 31-1940:
British S.S. Mill Hill, British Chelsea and Norwegian Norne, all torpedoed and sunk between 01:25 and 01:40 on Friday 30th August 1940 in approximate position 58 48N 06 50W. I take this to mean that Kyno, sunk on the 28th, must have sailed in the other section(?)

Commodore's notes on station keeping and signalling - HX 66A:
Station keeping "very good indeed, except Queen Maud who was generally astern of station. Signalling was "very good except Norwegian Grado who was very slow in answering signals." Esmond (Captain Davitt), Gregalia (Captain Bankiers), Dornoch (Captain Davies) and Thistlegorm (name of Master unknown) were column leaders and were "magnificently handled, and particularly helpful and smart in signalling. They were a great help to me."

Commodore Allen adds: "Commodores should be informed as far as possible (especially when approaching focal points such as North Channel and Pentland Firth) of the presence of other convoys.

There were two incidents, one before the convoy had "split" into its two portions, and one after.

First incident:
At 19:58/28th August, convoy HX 66, consisting of 53(?) ships in 8 columns was in position 58 06N 13 ?6W. The escort consisted of Mackay, Jason, Hibiscus and Heartsease. Heartsease was chasing stragglers (there's a diagram here, showing Mackay in a location at the front and to the right of the convoy, Jason at the front middle of convoy, and Heartsease at the rear, while the merchant Kyno is noted at the very front in the left column, in other words, station 11).

It was broad daylight, visibility was good; there was a biggish sea which made asdic conditions bad for sloops and corvettes; one in four of Mackay's impulses quenched and Heartsease's impulses quenched almost continuously.

The convoy was due to "split" when the Commanding Officer of Mackay heard an explosion; there was very little concussion, "it sounded almost like a gun." Mackay and the Commodore of the convoy agreed that the explosion was not like a torpedo and the possibility of a mine occurred to both. The escorting vessels proceeded as shown in the diagram (the diagram shows Mackay still in position to the front right of convoy, Jason in the front middle and Hibiscus to the front left of the convoy, with arrows drawn from Jason and Mackay towards the left of convoy and the word "search"). Mackay and Jason carried out a search in the direction shown up to 6 miles from the convoy without results, they then rejoined the convoy which had now "split".

Second Incident:
At 12:30/29th August, convoy HX 66 B consisting of about 28 ships in 5 columns was being escorted by Mackay and Heartsease, when Mackay received a signal from Heartsease "Torpedo passed 20 ft. astern of me." (Heartsease subsequently reported that this torpedo, which passed her 20 ft away, showed(?) a twin line of bubbles, with a mist of fumes or spray between them; it was getting very near the end of its run).

The mean course of the convoy was 127°; it had just started on a "zig" to port. Mackay considers that the torpedo passed down the port side of the first or second ship of the starboard column, which was just saved by the zigzag. On receipt of this signal Mackay turned to join Heartsease on the starboard side of the convoy. A signal was then received from Heartsease "course of torpedo 250°", indicating that the torpedo had been fired from the port side. Mackay therefore turned back towards the port bow of the convoy.

Meanwhile the Commodore ordered a large emergency turn to starboard to clear the "field of search". Heartsease cut through the rear of the convoy to join Mackay, who organised a search on the reciprocal of the torpedo's course. Shortly after joining, Heartsease obtained one echo at 500 yards and dropped one depth charge; thereafter she was a spectator owing to quenching. This was a very lucky echo and was useful to Mackay, who almost immediately confirmed it and started attacking course 270°, on a firm echo. Contact was lost at the normal time and one pattern was dropped.

On turning to attack again, Mackay found the target on his starboard bow instead of to port which showed that the U-boat had reversed its course. After turning, Mackay noticed a disturbing phenomenon namely: - "a cone of disturbed water, proceeding slowly, as if indicating that something was at the end of its run." It stopped 15 yards from his starboard side still whirling. The object was "5 or 6 ins. high, 5 ins. in diameter and conical with a hole in the top."

Mackay continued his attack and, during the second run in, a Sunderland Flying Boat confirmed his contact by dropping 3 250 lb. A/S bombs and 1 depth charge, which caused Mackay to lose contact prematurely on his way to drop his second pattern. A patch of oil appeared and Mackay carried out a third attack, the aircraft by this time having withdrawn. This attack appeared to be a good one but there were no indications of success except oil. There was a qualified A/S Officer in Mackay. The Commanding Officer of Mackay considers that the U-boat fired from the port bow of the convoy, at long range, so as to be outside Mackay's asdic range.

Suggestions and Observations by the Commanding Officer of Mackay:

a) A/S vessels escorting convoys on dark nights should not make asdic transmissions unless a U-boat is known to be in the vicinity.

b) The use of destroyers as Striking Force in the North Western Approaches is not advocated as they can hardly hope to meet with success except by luck; the inevitable errors in the reported position of the U-boat and the destroyers themselves renders success improbable. Successful search for a U-boat by any other type of vessel is still less likely owing to their low speed.

c) The obvious place to find a U-boat, unless on passage, is near the convoy; destroyers should be withdrawn from the Striking Forces and used as escorts, with sloops or corvettes to back them up. All important convoys should have two destroyers in their escorts, which should be stationed 50° on either bow at 3 miles.

d) Sloops and corvettes should be used as a close screen. In operational value one destroyer is considered to be worth 2 sloops or 6 corvettes. When a U-boat attacks, both destroyers should carry out a search and the sloops or corvettes should remain with the convoy.

e) In a rough, or even a moderate sea, a corvette hunting astern of a convoy which she has been escorting takes a long time to rejoin. Her asdic is very unreliable in a short, roughish sea.

f) When a destroyer is hunting and getting "warm" a corvette is liable to be a hindrance rather than a help. (But see para. 5 above [this is the paragraph starting with "meanwhile the Commodore ordered a large emergency turn])

All the Norwegian ships mentioned on this page are discussed on this website - see alphabet index below.

Back to Convoy Index