The text on the A 1 form is very vague, some guessing has taken place (hence the question marks).

Br=British, Eg=Egyptian, Fi=Finnish, Gr=Greek, Yug=Yugoslavian

Though Captain Swan and his officers were very helpful, the Commodore does not feel that Port Darwin is suitable for a Commodore's ship, because the "bridge very badly obstructed by two pill boxes making it very difficult to get about. Also, the signal halliards very poor, all long hoists had to be carried to the foremast".

The convoy had 42 ships, 37 of which were present at local escort rendezvous.

Average speed: 6.9 knots.

Ships parting company:
Greek Avra parted company without permission at 23:00 on Jan. 24. The weather was overcast with continuous rain, but there was no reason at all for her to leave the convoy. She had the rendezvous for the next 2 days, but didn't turn up then either. 6 days later a W/T message was received stating that she was ashore at starting point. There seems to be some confusion as to the name of this ship, it's listed as Avra and as Alvra in various documents for this convoy, and in his narrative the Commodore says: "I do not know if Admiralty assume any insurance liability for neutrals in convoy, but if they do (and if the Greek S.S. Avra is the same as Greek S.S. Alvra of this convoy then the owners have NO claim....".

Bolton Castle, Barrdale and Langleetarn left in 36 07N 12 02W for Hampton Roads (date is illegible, but time is given as 18:45).

The Finnish Tilda left without permission during the night of Jan. 29/30. She never answered signals and may have been astern of her station when the convoy course was altered at 02:00 on the 30th. The convoy could not be counted until 11:00 (30th), due to the thick weather, and that's when she was found to be missing.

Circe Shell, destination Bordeaux, left with the French escort on Jan. 31.

The West Coast portion left at 15:30 on Jan. 31 - see below.

Stanwold was unable to keep up at 7 knots. By daylight on ? Febr. she was "hull down 10 miles to the southward of convoy and steering diverging course. Ships of this uncertain performance are a handicap to a convoy".

Aldersdale left for Portland at 03:00 Febr. 2.

Pellicula left for Boulogne at 16:25 Febr. 2, and after dark on the same day Baron Ogilvy and Bulysses left for Southampton, Eocene for Rouen, Tahchee for Le Havre.

Station keeping, signalling etc.:
Gibraltar being a very difficult port to form up from, the station keeping was not good at first, but improved later, greatly helped by the Vice Commodore being put in station 43 to assist in preventing straggling. "He worked hard at this and being in a faster ship was able to steam about the lines hurrying(?) the stragglers - mainly by megaphone".

As for visual signalling, "much instruction of Masters and Officers still needed to get the best results. Flag signalling (and there was plenty of it) became fairly proficient, though here again a couple of slack ships causes endless delay. This convoy badly supplied with daylight signalling lamps. Chief Yeoman of Signals W. J. Wickens was of the greatest assistance and his continuous duties were most cheerfully carried out and his patience in dealing with 38/42 ships was very excellent".

Wireless silence was unbroken. "Despite a warning signal, excessive use of reaction by ships in the Convoy caused heavy interference in Commodore's ship. The W/T Receivers (Type 352 or MR4B) are general purpose models and re-radiate into the aerial with the use of reaction. It is emphasised that the Commodore's ship must have freedom from re-radiation from other ships to enable a constant search to be maintained. It is submitted that in the interest of W/T efficiency in the convoy, all ships, other than the Commodore, must keep their receivers in a non-oscillating state and thus avoid mutual interference".

The convoy contained several very bad "smokers", apparently due to bad Australian coal. The Commodore says that he "altered course on the 25th away from a supposedly accurate position of a U-boat so as to lessen chance of our smoke giving us away".

Summary of Commodore Washington's narrative of voyage:
There were altogether 12 enemy submarine reports on the convoy's route (some believed to have been duplicated), but only 2 U-boats were anywhere near its course. A French report "was definitely in our track for the 31st. After meeting local escorts at the first R.V. I asked for any further information about this report and got one word in reply 'SUNK' ".
3 explosions were heard some distance away to the northward at 19:40 on Jan. 31 (when in position 48 36N 8 12W), which sounded and felt like depth charges.
When the convoy was in position 48 59N 6 35W at 05:00 on Febr. 1, Wolverine, somewhat ahead of the convoy, signalled "investigating contact", and dropped one depth charge and a smoke float, then returned to the convoy. In the afternoon of Febr. 2 she dealt with 3 floating mines, 2 of which were detonated and 1 sunk, all believed to be British. Several emergency turns had had to be made because of these mines, and the Commodore says the conduct of several ships was poor, though their behaviour had been good up until that time.
That night visibility became very poor. The convoy only had 11 ships at that time, all for the Downs, sailing in a single line. Before dawn on the 3rd the ships became separated as fog came on. When in the vicinity of Dungeness it became necessary to anchor, Wolverine and Port Darwin doing so at 06:45. At around 11:00 Wolverine weighed to look around and located the Folkestone Gate buoys, so they proceeded again at noon, embarked the pilot and anchored off Ramsgate. The other ships also turned up, some before them, some later. Weighed again at 07:00 on Febr. 4, still in heavy fog, and proceeded to Tilbury.

Escorts:
HMS Leyland. Local escort until 18:00 on Jan. 25.
Ocean: French destroyers Panthere and Tigre for 7 days.
The rest is illegible, except for local escort Wolverine, which was met at 08:30 Jan. 31 in 48N 10W, and HMS Walpole, which came up from southward 3 hours later. (Ocean escorts sailed with the convoy from Gibraltar and parted company at 13:45 on Jan. 31 when local escort was complete).

Air Escort: At various times; French aircraft seen for a few hours on the 25th (from 09:00 to about 16:30). A British flying boat was present for an hour or so from 13:30 on the 31st, and again off the Isle of Wight on Febr. 2 at 12:15, which was "very helpful in correcting our position (weather overcast and no sights). Later aircraft assisted in pointing out floating mines".

Notes for West Coast portion:
18 ships bound for West Coast ports separated from the Southend portion at 15:30 on Jan. 31 (48 30N 09 00W) escorted by HMS Walpole, with Vice Admiral F. M. Austin acting as Commodore in Alca (Captain Marten). What follows is from his notes.

With regard to Alca, Vice Admiral Austin states that she "is not suitable for a Commodore's ship on account of the archaic and inefficient fitting of bridge. The bridge is small and absolutely open. The helmsman is entirely unprotected and is awkwardly placed at the rear of the bridge, 4 feet from the only compass, not even being allowed a mirror. On account of the low height of the compass, bearings are very difficult to take. The chart house is very small being a portion of the Captain's cabin below the bridge. There is no protection from wind or weather or from enemy action and this cannot be provided without structural alteration. It is understood that all vessels of the Yeoward Line are similarly designed. The space on the bridge is so confined that signalling has to be done from the deck below. It must be very difficult for a ship of this company to maintain any efficiency in bad weather and especially in convoy".

Average speed of convoy: 7.9 knots.

No date(s) given for the following:
2 depth charges, preceded by escort showing 2 red and 2 green lights - convoy turned by emergency signal 40 to starboard, 19:40 (possibly Jan. 31?). Later resumed mean course. No known result from depth charges.
1 depth charge preceded by signal from escort. Emergency turn of 20 to port, 09:30. Returned to mean course 09:45. Result not known.
Weather exceptionally good for time of year. Fog encountered for 12 hours passing Tuskar Rock - convoy remained in company.
Speed was increased to 8.5 knots in an ettempt to make Bar Light Vessel by 18:00, but when about 18 miles from Bar a signal was received with orders to use Route 2, complicating matters considerably as it was then "becoming thick, and darkness falling early. The sighting of Morecambe L.V. was a matter of considerable doubt and anxiety, but it was sighted about 2 miles away. Finally Bar L.V. was sighted right ahead about 10:10. Orders were then given for convoy to act independently. I should like to mention that in my opinion Captain Marten of Alca did a very creditable bit of pilotage. Visibility was about 2 miles, but varied considerably and caused much anxiety as to whether it would not be necessary to anchor instantly".

Pearlmoor, Orminster, British Premier, St. Anselm, Port Auckland and Zrinski (for Bristol Channel) parted company at 17:00 on Febr. 1 in 51 26N 06 42W - proceeded to Milford Haven for further orders.
British Hussar parted company at 12:00 on Febr. 2 in 53 22N 04 21W.
British Endeavour, Botusk and Thelma proceeded to Liverpool at 12:52 on Febr. 2 for further orders.

Station keeping was "not good on leaving Gibraltar, but much improved in many cases".
Very good: Orminster, Avoceta, British Hussar and Alca.
Good: Port Auckland, British Endeavour and Botusk.
Bad: St. Anselm (very bad), Tilda, Zrinsky, Mostyn and Thelma.
Average: Rest of ships.

Signalling was slow at first, but improved as the voyage progressed, some ships even becoming "very good"; Port Auckland, British Hussar, Orminster and Stagpool, while Pearlmoor, Thelma and Zrinski are judged to be "only fair". The rest of the ships were average at signalling, with the exception of St. Anselm which "could not or would not take in morse or semaphore. On one occasion, at 17:51 on Jan. 29 the officer taking in the signal deliberately turned away and hauled down his answering pendant and did the same after taking in a few words of morse. She kept a very bad look-out for signals and sometimes never answered at all".

Related external links:
HG (& SL) Convoys - In chronological order.
See also Mike Holdoway's website about
SL & SL/MKS convoys

Back to Convoy Index