Disposition of Escort
Colombo was in the convoy by day (position 51) as instructed by C.-in-C. W.A. message of Sept. 24-1939, patrolling across the front of the convoy by night, zig-zagging independently between 1 1/2 and 3 miles ahead, according to visibility. The Polish destroyer Blyskawica had station about 3 miles ahead during the day, zig-zagging across the front, in easy communication with Colombo. During the night the Polish escort was placed astern of the convoy where she was employed to keep off possible shadowers, shepherd out of range of the convoy any neutral ships encountered, and act as a watch dog on the rear ships, noting the names of those that could not keep up. Her job was also to inform any ships that had lights showing or whose stern lights were too bright.
"The Convoy manned 500 k/cs during single operator periods. Colombo and Blyskawica also set watch on 500 k/cs. Colombo maintained guard on 107 k/cs, Routines and Rugby broadcasts to British Merchant Ships. Blyskawica maintained D/F guard on 500 k/cs. She is not fitted to transmit (though she can receive) on 107 k/cs.
In view of the prevalence of R/T receivers in merchant ships, it was found that few ships required press news. Ships requiring press were given it daily at 17:00 by semaphore from Colombo.
At the convoy conference, "British Engineer, who had two operators, volunteered to keep a guard on Portishead for the Convoy. No messages were however received affecting the Convoy.
Blyskawica has no distinguishing signal other than signal letters. It is suggested she should be given pendants. Colombo and Commodore of the Convoy, by local arrangement, addressed her by black pendant. She also had no Mercantile Secret Call Sign. It is suggested that this might be remedied."
To sweep the straits ahead of the convoy, an anti-submarine destroyer screen was provided from Gibraltar, remaining until 22:00 on Sept. 26. Also, and anti-sub air patrol was present until after dark on Sept. 26, and through the daylight hours of the 27th.
The 5th Destroyer Division, local escort from Plymouth, joined p.m. on Oct. 3, disposed during the day 1 mile ahead, 8 cables apart, acting as cover for the front as the weather was not suitable for working Asdics. 2 destroyers were stationed 2 miles ahead during the night, with 1 destroyer 5 cables on either beam of the convoy. After the convoy had split up, 2 destroyers remained with the B portion of the convoy (stationed 2 miles ahead of each wing column during the night).
"The local escort, on joining, was ordered to set watch on 500 k/cs. This enabled enemy reports to reach both the Ocean Escort and Commodore of the Convoy simultaneously, and gave warning to other ships who might be listening out, of the probability of emergency V/S signals. Colombo assumed guard on 107 k/cs. Destroyers read their own routines as arranged by Imogen."
Tuesday, Sept. 26-1939
Convoy HG 1 was ordered to weigh at 14:00, after conference had been held ashore at 10:30. Ships were not under way until 15:00, as several had shown no signs of preparing for sea at 14:00. "It is recommended that a steamboat or tug might be sent round with N.C.S officer to speed up the operation of weighing".
A Spanish aricraft (M-CABE) flew around the convoy at about 16:30, making off in the direction of Ceuta.
At 18:15 the Japanese Noto Maru passed to the north of the convoy at a speed of 13 knots.
At about 20:00 Colombo closed a ship burning navigation lights on the convoy's starboard wing. This turned out to be the Yugoslavian Rosina Topic, which had been near the Yogoslavian prize Jurko Topic in station 63, but no intercommunication was detected. Rosina Topic was instructed to "keep clear" to which she replied "OK".
2 fishing vessels were passed at 23:00. Weather through the night was overcast with the moon appearing occasionally through the clouds.
Sept. 27
Exercised emergency turns a.m. and p.m., well carried out - again exercised after dark.
"Llangibby Castle's syren was difficult to hear, and since at night it was difficult to distinguish between green and white Verey's lights from any distance, the signalling was not very satisfactory. In addition, the Verey's lights must have been visible at a considerable distance. It is suggested that some form of fixed manoeuvring light might be fitted to the Commodore's ship."
Sept. 28
04:50 - An unknown darkened ship was sighted. This turned out to be S.S. Barlam, on a voyage from Plymouth to Gibraltar (Colombo's commander says: "Not listed in Lloyd's register").
20:00 - Blyskawica was detached for Plymouth, in view of the weather conditions and her small amount of fuel remaining.
22:10 - The Dutch Oostplein was encountered, destination Cape Verde.
"After the first few days out, signalling by the Convoy improved considerably. It was noticed that the time taken to pass "Alter Course" signals shortened as the Convoy's station keeping improved. Eleven ships in all carried Royal Naval signalmen lent from Dilwara."
"Under the present division of responsibility the Commodore of the Convoy has to initiate any signals required. His staff contained a Yeoman (V.S. I), a Leading Signalman and a Signalman. General semaphore messages, when required, therefore took a considerable time to pass. An increase in staff is thought highly desirable. Since it is considered unnecessary to have active service Naval signalmen (who in any case rarely handle these books) for this duty, it is suggested that a special convoy signal branch, trained in the International Code and Naval Appendix (or Merchant Navy Code) semaphore and morse, might be raised."
"It is recommended that a trained signal rating should always be placed in the rear of the centre column to pass signals to stragglers. If this ship and leading ships of columns were provided with Aldis lamps the rate at which messages could be passed out would be considerably increased.
Sept. 29
Gabbiano, as well as 1 of the 2 French(?) ships dropped astern through the night and were no longer seen at dawn. Convoy speed through the night had been 8 knots, with a 93% zig-zag. The convoy was unmanageable at a lower speed, so it was not practicable to reduce it in order to retain the 2 stragglers. Also, this may have caused the convoy to be late at the rendezvous for Oct. 3.
Sept. 30
10:00 - The Polish Pulaski, bound for Gibraltar, was encountered and contacted (funnel painted black and masts coloured yellow).
Oct. 1
Ships exchanged stations during the forenoon, in order to conform to their amended ports of destination.
11:40 - Altered course to 025°.
Oct. 2
Weather had deteriorated, and during the day wind and sea increased. Speed made good had dropped to 4 knots by 18:00.
23:30 - Colombo sighted a darkened ship which turned out to be Clearpool - shepherded back to the convoy.
Oct. 3
Speed made good during the night had been less than 4 knots, and the rendezvous was not reached at dawn. Being as the convoy was only 25 miles from the rendezvous, it was anticipated that the destroyers would have little difficulty in making contact. However, when they had not appeared by noon, a signal was made to C.-in-C. W.A., giving position, course and speed of the convoy, and at 14:00 the 5th Destroyer Division was sighted and closed convoy.
2 wireless messages from Gabbiano were intercepted, her position given as 50 miles northwest of Land's End.
Oct. 4
Westbury, Clearpool and Ilvington Court failed to keep up overnight - the latter rejoined at about 09:00.
12:00 - The convoy split up, HG 1A proceeding to Liverpool, escorted by HMS Imogen and HMS Ilex.
The weather now improved, speed was increased and zig-zag re-commenced.
Ilvington Court was ordered by the Commodore to part company when abreast of Falmouth, having reported that she was running short of coal.
Oct. 5
Westbury rejoined during the night.
07:40 - Anti-sub air patrol was sighted.
14:00 - HMS Intrepid and HMS Echo took over the escort duties of the convoy, and Colombo proceeded for Devonport with Abbeydale, HMS Isis and HMS Imperial.
Suggestions for Improvements of Convoy Arrangements:
"In view of the fact that Submarines are known to have been operating off the coast of Spain, and as departures of Convoys from Gibraltar are bound to be reported, it is strongly recommended that every Convoy should be accompanied by at least one destroyer or other Anti-submarine vessel, in order to sight Submarines on the surface ahead of the Convoy by day, and to prevent shadowers and to deal with Submarine attacks on ships by night.
It is considered that all ships forming part of a convoy should be capable of at least ten knots. In bad weather smaller, slower ships are unable to maintain a speed of even seven knots, and at this speed the larger ships, particularly Motor vessels, become unmanageable. (At one time Convoy HG 1 was reduced to three and one half knots). It also seems unsafe for such ships as Dilwara and Largs Bay to have to travel at such low speeds in waters in which Submarines have been reported.
It is recommended that the Commodore of the Convoy should make a reference position at noon daily in view of the probability of ships becoming detached in bad weather."
"The instructions laid down in the Naval Appendix for reductions of speed by the Guide during alterations of course were (intentionally) not carried out. In consequence, doubt sometimes arose as to the speed at which the Guide ship was proceeding, and the time taken for leading ships of the outer columns to regain bearing was excessive. It is considered a bad practice NOT to hoist the signal to resume the original speed of the fleet, even if it is intended to carry out the manoeuvre using station keeping increase only."
Handling of the Convoy:
"The Commodore of the Convoy handled the Convoy well and his address at the preliminary meeting was good and was well received. In this connection, it is noted that, in accordance with the Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches' orders the Ocean Escort was stationed in the convoy and manoeuvred by the Commodore of the convoy (in accordance with C.A.F.O. 1441/39, para. 2B), although this officer was junior to the Senior Officer of the escort."
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